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Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.: A Misuse of the
Federal Trademark Doctrine of Commercial Use
IN RESCUECOM CORP. V. GOOGLE, INC.,' THE UNITED STATES District Court for the
Northern District of New York considered whether a search engine's sale of one
company's trademark to its competitors to establish priority placement in an In-
ternet user's search results constitutes commercial use under the Lanham Act.2 In
finding that such sales are not commercial use, the court failed to accord proper
weight to countervailing persuasive authority.' In doing so, the court crafted a rule
favoring search engines' misappropriation of the value of other companies' trade-
marks, and relied on clearly distinguishable cases unsupportive of its decision.'
I. THE CASE
Rescuecom Corp. ("Rescuecom") is a computer services franchisor with over sixty-
seven franchises offering computer repair, consulting, networking and Internet ser-
vices.' It owns the federally registered trademark, "Rescuecom,"6 and has become
renowned in its market for providing outstanding service. Rescuecom also owns
the Internet domain name "rescuecom.com," and it conducts a substantial amount
of business over the Internet through this website.7 Because of this, its rights in the
"Rescuecom" mark have become a valuable business asset.8
J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2008; B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University.
1. 456 F. Supp. 2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
2. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (2006)); Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397-98.
3. See infra Part IV.A.
4. See infra Part IV.B.
5. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 396. The court accepted as true Rescuecom's allegations of fact for
purposes of Google's motion to dismiss. Id.
6. Id. The court misstates the process by which Rescuecom obtained rights in the "Rescuecom" mark. The
application for registration of the "Rescuecom" trademark was filed with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office by Deft Computer Solutions, Inc. in March of 1998. Trademark Assignment Abstract of Title -
RESCUECOM, Serial No. 75979083, Reg. No. 2344142 (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http://assignments.uspto.
gov/assignments/q?db=tm&qt=sno&reel=&frame=&sno=75979083. The mark was registered in 2000, and in
October of 2001, Deft Computer solutions, Inc. assigned the entire interest in the "Rescuecom" trademark to
Rescuecom. Id.
7. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 396. Rescuecom's website has 17,000 to 30,000 visitors per month. Id.
8. Id.
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Google, Inc. ("Google") owns the domain name "google.com," from which it
operates one of the most popular search engines on the Internet.9 Internet users
can type search terms into Google's website, which then lists numerous results in
order of relevance using Google's patented software.'" Google is able to "ascertain
the subject, company, goods, or services in which the Internet user is interested,"
and it uses this information to sell advertising space on the google.com website
through its "AdWords" software." Once an advertiser purchases a keyword from
Google, when an Internet user searches for that keyword, a "sponsored link" to the
advertiser's website will appear on Google's website, either to the right or immedi-
ately above the ordinary search results.' Google also recommends keywords to ad-
vertisers through a "Keyword Suggestion Tool," and its recommended keywords
may include competitors' trademarks. 3
Rescuecom and its competitors advertise on google.com. 4 Many of Rescuecom's
competitors have purchased the keyword "Rescuecom" through Google's AdWords
program,' and Google has recommended "Rescuecom" as a keyword to several of
Rescuecom's competitors. 6 Based on these facts, Rescuecom filed suit against
Google claiming federal trademark infringement and false designation of origin. s
Google moved to dismiss. 9
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. AdWords allows advertisers to bid on keywords that Internet users might enter as search terms on
Google's search engine. Id. at 397.
12. Id. Google does not always identify sponsored links as advertisements, and those appearing immedi-
ately above the ordinary search results appear to be part of the ordinary search results. Id. Thus, "Internet users
may infer . . . that a sponsored link is the most relevant website among the search results." Id.
13. Id.; see also Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 2005 WL 832398,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (denying counter-defendant's motion to dismiss counterclaims of contributory
trademark infringement and dilution).
14. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 396-97. Rescuecom has purchased the rights to have sponsored links on
google.com, one of which appears above or to the right of the ordinary search results when an Internet user
inputs the search term "Rescuecom." Id. at 397.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006) ("Any person who shall, without the consent of
the registrant-(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any . . . services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable
in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.").
18. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96; see Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) ("Any person
who, on or in connection with any goods or services... uses in commerce any word, term, name, . . . or any
false designation of origin .... which-(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her ... services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act."). Rescuecom also
brought claims of federal trademark dilution, Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), common law trade-
mark infringement, Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 395-96, and state law trademark dilution. N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 360-L (Consol. 2006).
19. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 395. Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Sections 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act safeguard the "intangible connotations
which are not facially apparent [that] are attached to a name, 2' and protect con-
sumers from being misled or confused by one company marketing its products or
services under another company's trademarks.2"
In order to prove a claim for trademark infringement or unfair competition, a
plaintiff must prove five elements: "(1) that it possesses a mark; (2) that the defen-
dant used the mark; (3) that the defendant's use of the mark occurred 'in com-
merce';22 (4) that the defendant used the mark 'in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising' of goods or services; and (5) that the defen-
dant used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers."23 Section 45 of the
Lanham Act states:
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the
ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For
purposes of this [Act], a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce ... on
services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and
the services are rendered in commerce ... and the person rendering the services
is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.24
However, as noted above, the phrase "use in commerce" actually encompasses two
elements of the test for trademark infringement. Before reaching the question of
whether a use is "in commerce" within that term's meaning under the Lanham Act,
there is a threshold question of whether the utilization of a trademark constitutes
"use" under the Act. The display of a trademark only constitutes "use," or "trade-
mark use" if the mark is used as an indicator of the source or origin of the user's
products or services.25
20. Scott Paper Co. v. Scott Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1227 (3d Cir. 1978).
21. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003).
22. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
23. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. Alpha of Va., 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995)); Lanham Act § 32(1),
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (stating, in relevant part: "a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce-... (2)
on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in
commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State .. .and the person rendering the services is
engaged in commerce in connection with the services"). Some courts have applied elements (2) (3) and (4) of
the test collectively to form the concept of "trademark use." See Gov't Employees Ins. Co. (GEICO) v. Google,
Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("Trademark use" is "use [of] the marks 'in commerce' and 'in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of ... services ....').
24. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). There are, of course, fair use exceptions to the "use in
commerce" rule of section 45; however, whether potentially infringing "uses are legitimate fair uses of the
trademark[s] in competition ... [is a] fact-specific issue[ I not properly resolved through a motion to dismiss."
GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
25. See GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702-03; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text; infra note 119
and accompanying text; accord Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 757 (E.D. Mich.
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In the Internet context, the issue of what constitutes "trademark use" has not
been clearly resolved.26 There has been an evolution of the trademark use doctrine,
with cases continuing to craft the law with respect to four primary categories of
use, each relating to, and often affecting, the others. These categories are: website
domain names, pop-up advertisements, metatags, and search-engine advertising.
A. Website domain names
One of the first contexts in which issues concerning trademark infringement via
the Internet arose involved the use of another's trademark as a website domain
name. In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Doughney,27 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant engages in commer-
cial use when its registration of a domain name utilizing someone else's trademark
prevents Internet users from accessing the trademark holder's goods or services.28
Similarly, the court in OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc.29 held that a website
registrant uses another's trademark in connection with services in commerce when
the operation of the website is "likely to prevent or hinder Internet users from
accessing [the trademark holder's] services on [its] own website."'
B. Pop-up advertising
The courts considering pop-up advertising cases have generally distinguished them
from those involving website domain names. In U-Haul International, Inc. v.
WhenU.com, Inc.,3 WhenU created a program that caused pop-up windows to ap-
pear when Internet users visited certain websites. These pop-up windows displayed
advertisements for competitors of the website that the user visited. 2 To determine
what pop-up to display, WhenU's program utilized a directory of lists of terms that
included trademarked words and phrases to define different categories of products
2003) (stating that "[tihere can be no liability under the Lanham Act absent the use of a trademark in a way
that identifies the products and services being advertised by the defendant").
26. See infra Parts II.A-D.
27. 263 F.3d 359.
28. Id. at 365. This is because users who are presumably searching for the trademark holder's services "may
instead opt to select [the services] contained in defendant's web site." Id. (quoting OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight
Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v.
Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding use in commerce because "[pirospective users
of plaintiffs services who mistakenly access defendant's web sit [sic] may fail to continue to search for plain-
tiffs own home page, due to anger, frustration, or the belief that plaintiffs home page does not exist"); qf Wells
Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (requiring a use to be source-identifying in order to constitute a use in
commerce).
29. 86 F. Supp. 2d 176 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
30. Id. at 183; accord Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998), af'd, 159 F.3d 1351
(3d Cir. 1998) (stating that using another's trademark as a website domain name is a commercial use because it
takes advantage of the trademark holder's goodwill, and because it restricts the trademark holder from realiz-
ing the full value of their mark).
31. 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).
32. Id. at 726.
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and services." The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found that
WhenU's use of this program did not constitute trademark infringement or unfair
competition. In doing so, it relied on two distinctions from the website cases. 4
First, it noted that WhenU did not use competitors' trademarks to direct traffic to
its own website.3 Second, the court emphasized that the pop-up advertisements
did not hinder Internet users' ability to access the website of the company with
which they intended to do business. 6 The court also relied on the fact that WhenU
did not sell the right to have an advertisement triggered by a particular competi-
tor's trademark or domain name.37
Similarly, in another case involving WhenU.com, 38 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan found that the company's pop-up advertising program
did not violate the Lanham Act. 9 The court stated that "[t]he inclusion of web
addresses in WhenU's [categorized directory] is done to identify the category the
. . . consumer is interested in . . . . WhenU does not use any of the plaintiff's
trademarks to indicate anything about the source of the products and services it
advertises."" Unlike using a competitor's trademark in a domain name, WhenU's
pop-up program did not direct Internet users away from one company's website by
using that company's trademark to advertise competing goods and services.'
Therefore, although WhenU's pop-up program used competitors' trademarks in-
ternally, it did not advertise goods or services under competitors' trademarks and
did not prevent Internet users from reaching their intended destination.42 Accord-
ingly, the pop-up advertising program did not constitute a commercial use under
the Lanham Act.4"
33. Id. at 725-26.
34. Id. at 729.
35. Id. at 727.
36. Id. at 729.
37. Id. at 728. In holding that the absence of sale of rights to particular trademarks prevented a finding of
trademark infringement, the court relied on DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003). In
Bloom, the Eighth Circuit held that a former Mercedes dealer's use of the phone number 1-800-637-2333 (1-
800-MERCEDES) did not constitute trademark infringement because the dealer apparently did not advertise
the number's alphanumeric translation. Id. at 934, 938-39. The court held that absent any promotion utilizing
the Mercedes trademark, the dealer was not using the trademark in commerce. Id. at 938-39.
38. Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenUcom, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
39. Id. at 757.
40. Id. at 762.
41. Id. at 759 (distinguishing PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001), and Planned Parenthood
Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
42. Id. at 759.
43. Id. at 757.
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C. Metatags
The use of competitors' trademarks in a website's metatags" generally has been
held to constitute use in commerce under the Lanham Act.4" As described in an oft-
quoted Ninth Circuit opinion, "[u]sing another's trademark in one's metatags is
much like posting a sign with another's trademark in front of one's store .... Even
consumers who prefer [the trademark owner] may find it not worth the trouble to
continue searching for [the owner's website] since there is [a provider of similar
competing services] right there."46 Such use steers Internet users away from the
trademark holder's website they are searching for and toward the competitor's site.
Thus, it implicates a commercial use in connection with the sale of goods or ser-
vices, and therefore constitutes actionable trademark use.47
The courts in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Asiafocus International, Inc.4" and Play-
boy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label" held that the defendants' use of the
"Playboy" and "Playmate" trademarks in the metatags for their websites, which
competed with Playboy's website, constituted commercial use.5" In relying on these
cases, the court in Bihari v. Gross stated that in that case the defendants' metatags
constituted trademark use because the defendants "were clearly attempting to divert
potential customers from Playboy's website to their own."'" Similarly, although it
did not directly address the issue of commercial use, in Promatek Industries, Ltd. v.
Equitrac Corp.52 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Equitrac's
use of "Copatrack" in its metatags was grounds to grant a preliminary injunction
for trademark infringement where "Copatrak" was Promatek's registered trademark
which it used on equipment that Equitrac serviced. 3
44. For a definition of "metatag," see Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.,
174 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Metatags are HTML [HyperText Markup Language] code intended to
describe the contents of the web site. There are different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us
are the 'description' and 'keyword' metatags. The description metatags are intended to describe the web site;
the keyword metatags, at least in theory, contain keywords relating to the contents of the web site. The more
often a term appears in the metatags and in the text of the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will
be 'hit' in a search for that keyword and the higher on the list of 'hits' the web page will appear.").
45. GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing the following cases as author-
ity for the proposition that the use of trademarks in metatags constitutes trademark use: Bihari v. Gross, 119 F.
Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., Civil Action No. 97-734-A, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 1998)). "[Clourts have found that the use of trademarks in 'metatags,'
which are invisible text within websites that are used by search engines for indexing, constitute a use in com-
merce under the Lanham Act." Id.
46. Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1064 n.15.
47. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
48. Civil Action No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359.
49. 985 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
50. Asiafocus, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 at *3, *6-7; Calvin Designer Label, 985 F. Supp. at 1221.
51. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
52. 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).
53. Id. at 811.
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D. Search engine advertising
Closely akin to the use of trademarks in metatags is the scenario where one com-
pany purchases a competitor's trademarks as keywords for priority placement on
search engines. Where an Internet user searching for one particular company ends
up at a competitor's website because of a search engine's sale of that company's
trademark as a keyword, such sale has been held to constitute a commercial use of
the trademark under the Lanham Act. 4
In Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO) v. Google, Inc.,"5 Google of-
fered, for a fee, to place advertisers' website links above and to the right of the
normal search results an Internet user would see when they searched for specific
terms on Google's search engine.5 6 Included in the terms to which advertisers could
purchase rights were competitors' trademarks." GEICO filed suit against Google,
claiming that its sale of GEICO's trademarks for priority search listings violated the
Lanham Act." In denying Google's motion to dismiss, the court stated that it was
an unlawful use of GEICO's trademarks to "allow[ ] advertisers to bid on the trade-
marks" and accept a fee for linking advertisers to them. 9
In a subsequent case involving Google's sale of one company's trademarks to its
competitors as search terms, another court denied Google's motions to dismiss the
plaintiff's federal trademark infringement claims.' With respect to Google's
Keyword Suggestion Tool, the court stated, "Google actively and deliberately en-
courages [plaintiff]'s competitors to purchase as keywords .. . the [plaintiff's]
Marks . ". .. "As a result, the court rejected Google's claim that it was not making
commercial use of the plaintiff's trademarks.62 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reached a similar decision in a case with analogous facts, holding that where
two search engines sold the plaintiff's trademarks to its competitors as advertising
54. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); see also GEICO
v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (stating that "when [search engines] sell the rights to
link advertising to plaintiff's trademarks, defendants are using the trademarks in commerce in a way that may
imply that defendants have permission from the trademark holder to do so"). Similarly, the purchase of a
competitor's trademark as search engine keywords has been held to be trademark use. See Edina Realty, Inc. v.
TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, *7 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (denying the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the defendant's purchase of the plaintiff's
trademark as a keyword to prompt the appearance of defendant's sponsored link advertisements on a search
engine was a use in commerce).
55. 330 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
56. id.
57. Id. at 701-02.
58. Id. at 702.
59. Id. at 703-04.
60. Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 2005 WL 832398 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 2005).
61. Id. at *2.
62. Id. at *5.
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keywords, there was "no dispute" that they had engaged in trademark use of the
plaintiffs marks.63
In a 2006 case, the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey defined
three ways that a search engine's sale of one company's trademarks to its competi-
tors to establish priority search listings constitutes commercial use.64 By conducting
such sales, the search engine (a) trades on the value of the mark, (b) "act[s] as a
conduit to steer potential customers away from [the plaintiff] to [its] competitors,"
and (c) identifies marks that it considers effective search terms and markets them
to the trademark owner's competitors." Moreover, the court noted that "the more
money advertisers bid and the more frequently advertisers include [the plaintiff]'s
trademarks among their selected search terms, the more advertising income [the
search engine] is likely to gain. 66 Thus, in this case, the court appears to have
expanded the definition of a commercial use applied in the earlier cases in order to
provide broader protection for trademark holders from misappropriation
of goodwill.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
The Rescuecom court began by acknowledging that the Second Circuit has not con-
sidered whether an Internet search engine's sale of another company's trademark to
its competitors as a search term for use in advertising constitutes trademark in-
fringement under the Lanham Act.67 The court then criticized and distinguished
GEICO and Edina Realty on the grounds that the courts in those cases failed to
consider the issue of "use" as separate from "use in commerce" and likelihood of
confusion.6 The court stated that these cases were inconsistent with Second Circuit
precedent because they did not explicitly treat "trademark use, in commerce, and
likelihood of confusion [as] three separate elements." Because the Second Circuit in
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. treated "use" as a threshold question sepa-
rate from the other elements, the Rescuecom court stated that these cases' summary
treatment of the commercial use element was inappropriate.69 As a result, the court
denied Rescuecom's assertion that Google's sale of the "Rescuecom" trademark to
Rescuecom's competitors constituted commercial use under section 45 of the Lan-
ham Act,7° striking down the company's four arguments in turn.
63. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
64. 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2006).
65. Id. at 285.
66. Id.
67. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 398 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
68. Id. at 399-400; see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
69. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 399-400 (citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,
412 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, the Rescuecom court also expressly recognized that the Edina Realty court dealt
specifically with the issue of "use in commerce." Id. at 398.
70. Id. at 400-03; see Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); supra notes 22-23 and accompanying
text.
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First, the court stated that even if Rescuecom were to prove that Google capital-
ized on the goodwill of Rescuecom's trademark by marketing it to Rescuecom's
competitors to generate advertising revenues, this does not constitute use within
the meaning of section 45.7 The court also found that the fact that Google's use of
the mark may lure customers away from Rescuecom to its competitors did not
establish commercial use.7 2 The court stated that Rescuecom's reliance on PETA v.
Doughney was misplaced," and instead relied on the pop-up cases in finding that
the display of links to competitors' websites was not a commercial use.74
Next, the court struck down Rescuecom's argument that the alteration of In-
ternet users' search results resulting from Google's sale of the Rescuecom mark
constituted trademark use." It also rejected Rescuecom's argument that Google's
internal utilization of the mark as a trigger for display of competitors' advertise-
ments established trademark use, again relying on the pop-up cases.76 Thus, be-
cause it considered the question of trademark use to be a threshold issue, the court
did not reach the issue of likelihood of confusion.7 7 Accordingly, the court found
that Rescuecom could not prove its claims for trademark infringement and unfair
competition, and it granted Google's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).7
71. See Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (citing 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 412) ("Although these facts
may suffice to satisfy the 'in commerce' and likelihood of confusion requirements at the pleading stage, without
an allegation of trademark use in the first instance, [Rescuecom] cannot sustain a cause of action for trademark
infringement.").
72. Id. at 401.
73. Id. The Rescuecom court distinguished Doughney as a case where the defendant's registration of a
website domain name consisting of the plaintiffs trademark "directly" prevented Internet users from reaching
the plaintiffs website. Id. (citing PETA v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001)). The court stated that the
display of links to Rescuecom's competitors' websites does not necessarily prevent Internet users from reaching
Rescuecom's website, and thus does not directly affect the accessibility of Rescuecom's website. Id.
74. id.
75. Id. at 402; see supra note 23 regarding "trademark use." The court noted in this respect that the Second
Circuit has not endorsed the cases from other jurisdictions holding that use of others' trademarks in metatags
and banner ads on search engines can give rise to a finding of trademark use. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at
402. Because of this, the court found that the fact that Rescuecom's trademark was not displayed on any of its
competitors' sponsored links on Google's webpage barred a finding of trademark use. Id. at 402 (citing GEICO
v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004)).
76. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 403. Relying on 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, the court held that
absent any allegation that Google used the Rescuecom mark as an indicator of source or origin, Rescuecom
could not prove that Google engaged in trademark use of the Rescuecom mark. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at
403.
77. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (quoting 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 412 (internal citations
omitted)).
78. Id. at 404; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court also rejected Rescuecom's dilution claims based
on its finding that Rescuecom failed to allege facts tending to prove that Google made "trademark use" of
Rescuecom's trademark. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 403-04. Having dismissed all of Rescuecom's federal
claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdictions over Rescuecom's state law claims. Id. at 404.
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,79 the court failed to analyze the use-in-com-
merce element of the plaintiffs federal trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition claims under the appropriate standards. In light of persuasive authority, and
given the novelty of the issue presented, the court should have found that the alle-
gations presented were sufficient to entitle Rescuecom to present evidence on its
claims at trial under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.8" Moreover, due consideration of
the practical impact of the court's decision would have counseled against granting
Google's motion to dismiss.8
A. The court erred in granting Google's motion to dismiss.
The sale of one company's trademark as a keyword resulting in priority placement
of a competitor's advertisements in Internet search results constitutes use in com-
merce under the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act's definition of use in commerce
82
"is concerned with . . . the sale of... services in a manner likely to lead to con-
sumer confusion as to the[ir] source."" This, combined with the plain language of
section 45,84 suggests that the court erred in finding that Google did not engage in
trademark use85 of the Rescuecom mark.
86
The court itself recognized that both the "use" and "in commerce" elements of
trademark infringement are satisfied where one website uses another company's
trademark in its metatags.87 In Bihari v. Gross, the use of a trademark in metatags
was not a visible use, but nonetheless the court in that case found that the diversion
of potential customers satisfied the use in commerce requirement. 8 This directly
contradicts the Rescuecom court's argument that appropriation of a trademark
79. 456 F. Supp. 2d 393.
80. See id. at 397 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)) ("A court may not dismiss an
action [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)] 'unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief.'").
81. See infra Part W.B.
82. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
83. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2005).
84. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
85. GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702 (E.D. Va. 2004); see supra note 23.
86. While it is true that, "[t]he mere use of another's name on the Internet ... is not per se commercial
use," Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1998), use of another's
trademark will constitute commercial use where it "effectively act~s] as a conduit, steering potential customers
away from [the plaintiff's business] and toward its competitors." Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
87. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Bihari, 119 F.
Supp. 2d at 318).
88. Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 318 (citing Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998)).
The Rescuecom court relied in part on the fact that Rescuecom's trademark was not visible anywhere within the
text of Rescuecom's competitors' advertisements displayed in Internet users' search results. Rescuecom, 456 F.
Supp. 2d at 397.
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holder's goodwill through sale or use of its trademarks to competitors does not
constitute a use in commerce. 9
Google clearly made commercial use of the Rescuecom trademark in two ways:
first, by suggesting the mark as a keyword to Rescuecom's competitors; 90 and sec-
ond, by selling the mark as a keyword to establish priority position for the compet-
itors' advertisements. 91 Instead of following Bihari and applying the metatag
analysis to this analogous situation, the court unduly relied on the pop-up cases in
finding that Google's suggestion and sale of the Rescuecom trademark were not
commercial use.92 These cases can be distinguished in several respects, and the
court chose unwisely by using them in this manner.
1. The court's reliance on the pop-up cases was misplaced.
The pop-up cases involved WhenU's use of trademarks in internal coding. WhenU
did not market trademarks as keywords to which advertisers could directly
purchase rights. 93 The display of any particular pop-up advertisement was the result
of an Internet searcher's inquiry into a general category of goods or services as
defined by WhenU.94 Unlike Google's sale of particular trademarks to alter an In-
ternet user's search results, WhenU's sale of rights to a general product or service
category did not determine whether one particular competitor's pop-up advertise-
ment would be displayed as the result of an Internet user's search for another com-
pany's trademark.95 Moreover, in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.,9" the
Second Circuit distinguished GEICO on the grounds that pop-up advertisements
do not "link trademarks to any particular competitor's ads, and a customer cannot
pay to have its pop-up ad appear on any specific website or in connection with any
particular trademark."'97 This suggests that the Second Circuit would have ruled in
favor of the trademark owner had the facts resembled those in GEICO. Thus, under
89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
90. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
91. Id.
92. See generally 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); U-Haul Int'l, Inc.
v. WhenUcom, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003). See also Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 401-04.
93. See GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing U-Haul Int'l, 279 F. Supp.
2d 723).
94. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 411 ("WhenU does not 'sell' keyword trademarks to its customers or
otherwise manipulate which category-related advertisement will pop up in response to any particular terms on
the internal directory.").
95. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 762 (E.D. Mich. 2003) ("The
inclusion of web addresses in WhenU's proprietary Directory is done to identify the category the participating
consumer is interested in .... WhenU does not use any of the plaintiffs' trademarks to indicate anything about
the source of the products and services it advertises."); see also 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 403; U-Haul Int'l,
279 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
96. 414 F.3d 400.
97. Id. at 412 (distinguishing GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d 700).
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the WhenU analysis the court should have ruled in favor of Rescuecom because in
this case Google was committing the same acts that were at issue in GEICO.9"
Additionally, in 1-800 Contacts, to validate the use of trademarks in the code
underlying pop-up windows, the Second Circuit relied on the analogy that, "it is
routine for vendors to seek specific 'product placement' in retail stores precisely to
capitalize on their competitors' name recognition." " The Rescuecom court purports
to rely on 1-800 Contacts in its decision,' °° but this analogy does not extend to the
pay-for-priority search engine context. Google is selling rights to benefit from an
Internet user's search for Rescuecom, and the competitors that buy these rights
have their website links more prominently displayed than Rescuecom's on Google's
website."°" Moreover, in the retail store context, design trademarks and trade dress
can readily be identified to distinguish competing brands. On Google's website this
is not the case. When someone searches for Rescuecom they are shown a link to
both Rescuecom's and Rescuecom's competitors' websites, with no indication that
the competitors are unrelated to Rescuecom.' °2 Thus, not only is Google trading on
the value of Rescuecom's mark,"°3 it also is preventing Rescuecom from realizing
the full value of its goodwill and the protections afforded by fundamental trade-
mark doctrine. °4 Therefore, Google is engaging in commercial use of Rescuecom's
mark under Lanham Act section 45.
2. The court failed to give due consideration to the metatag and search engine
cases.
The court also failed to accord proper weight to the principles established in the
metatags and search engine cases. The court in 800-JR Cigar identified three ways
in which a search engine's sale of trademarks as search terms constitutes commer-
cial use.' All three of these directly apply to Google's suggestion and sale of
Rescuecom's mark. 6 First, Google trades on the value of Rescuecom's mark by
98. GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 701-02; cf Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 396-97
(N.D.N.Y. 2006) (involving Google's sale of the right to receive priority placement in Google's search results
when users search for a competitor's trademark).
99. 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 411.
100. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
101. Id. at 397. Sponsored Links on Google's website are displayed either above or to the right of the
standard search results. The Sponsored Links displayed above the standard results are surrounded by a light
blue background, whereas the standard results are displayed with a white background.
102. Id.
103. 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (D.N.J. 2006).
104. Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998), affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998);
accord Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2D 1430, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, *16
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
105. 800-JR Cigar, 437 F. Supp. 2d. at 285; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
106. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 396-97. It also is noteworthy that while the court in 800-JR Cigar relied
on the GEICO decision, its reasoning also can be seen as relying on the plain language of section 45 of the
Lanham Act. See supra Part IV.A.I.
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selling rights to use it as a search term to Rescuecom's competitors."°7 Second,
Google's sale of the mark is likely to result in the diversion of Rescuecom's poten-
tial clients to its competitors because a search for "Rescuecom" on Google's website
returns most prominently links to Rescuecom's competitors' websites. 8 Third,
Google's marketing of the Rescuecom mark through its suggestion tool presumably
further enhances Google's pecuniary spoils from the value of the Rescuecom
mark. 9 Thus, the court should have found that Google engaged in commercial use
of the Rescuecom mark.
The Rescuecom court, in a footnote, states that Rescuecom's reliance on Playboy,
Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp."' and Bihari is misplaced because the courts
in those cases did not directly confront the issue of whether the uses at issue consti-
tuted trademark use."' This, however, is a misconstruction of the reasoning in
those cases. The Ninth Circuit in Netscape simply stated that Netscape and Excite
"clearly ... used [Playboy's] marks in commerce" without further analysis of the
issue where the search engines sold priority rights to the Playboy marks as search
terms." 2 Similarly, the court in Bihari held that the "steering [of] potential custom-
ers away from [the trademark owner's business] and toward its competitors" con-
stituted trademark use without further analysis." 3 The Rescuecom court reads this
presumptive treatment to invalidate their support for Rescuecom's position;" 4 but,
in fact, such treatment provides even stronger support for Rescuecom's claim that
Google engaged in commercial use of its mark. Clearly, had these courts intuited
that the uses involved did not satisfy the "threshold" requirement of commercial
use, they would have spent more time addressing the issue." 5 Contrary to the
court's opinion in Rescuecom, these courts' presumption of satisfaction of the com-
mercial use requirement provides strong support for the argument that Google's
analogous use was a use in commerce.
B. The practical implications of the decision further demonstrate that the court
erred in granting Google's motion to dismiss.
The court's decision in Rescuecom. 6 creates a stumbling block for future plaintiffs
alleging trademark infringement and unfair competition by a search engine selling
the plaintiffs marks to its competitors. The opinion fails to articulate a standard
either supporting or resulting from its finding that the circumstances presented did
107. 800-JR Cigar, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
108. 800-JR Cigar, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
109. 800-JR Cigar, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 285; Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
110. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
111. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 402 n.5.
112. Netscape, 354 F.3d at 1024.
113. 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
114. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 402 n.5.
115. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005).
116. Rescuecom, 456 F. Supp. 2d 393.
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not establish use in commerce of the Rescuecom mark. The court purports to rely
on the pop-up cases, but these cases involve clearly distinguishable factual circum-
stances." 7 The court then goes on to dismiss arguments supported by the more
analogous cases involving metatags and search engines' sale of trademarks as search
terms."8 As a result, there emerges no clear logical support for the court's pretrial
dismissal of Rescuecom's claims.
Moreover, the practical effect of the court's decision may be so minimal as to
render its factual distinctions irrelevant. It is not disputed that the company
purchasing a competitor's trademark from a search engine as a search term is mak-
ing commercial use of that competitor's mark in violation of the Lanham Act." 9
This bar on the purchase of rights to use competitors' trademarks as search terms
suggests that, even if courts follow the Rescuecom decision, in the long run the
enforcement of the principles set forth in Edina Realty will severely inhibit, if
not eliminate completely, search engines' ability to sell rights to use other
companies' trademarks.
"The Court[s] must avoid ... rigidity ... in the Internet context because emerg-
ing technologies require a flexible approach." 2 ' In this case the court applied an
un-anticipating doctrine better suited for traditional media. The doctrinal defini-
tion of trademark infringement becomes unworkable and inapplicable in the
search engine context, and in itself suggests a need to reassess the validity of a
strictly precedential approach to trademark infringement cases in light of
emerging technologies.
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Rescuecom'2' held that Google's sale of the Rescuecom trademark to
Rescuecom's competitors as a keyword to establish priority placement for the com-
petitors' website links on Google's search page did not constitute commercial use
under the Lanham Act.'22 The court therefore dismissed Rescuecom's Lanham Act
claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition.'23 In doing so, the court
accorded undue weight to distinguishable cases, and created a standardless new
rule that finds no support in the plain language of the Lanham Act or in the com-
mon law.'24
117. Id. at 401; see supra Part II.B.
118. 456 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03; see supra Parts II.C-D.
119. Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064, *7 (D. Minn.
Mar. 20, 2006). This bar on the purchase of rights to use competitors' trademarks as search terms suggests that,
even if courts follow the Rescuecom decision, in the long run the enforcement of the principles set forth in
Edina Realty will severely inhibit, if not eliminate completely, search engines' ability to sell rights to use other
companies' trademarks.
120. Id. at *4 (citing Brookfield Commc'n, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir.
1999)).
121. 456 F. Supp. 2d 393.
122. Id. at 401-02.
123. Id. at 404; see supra Part III.
124. See supra Part IV.A.
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